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Abstract 
Debates	over	 the	 legal	 interpretation	of 	 trade	 treaty	 (WTO	and	NAFTA)	exemption	clauses	 for	
public	services	display	a	common	pattern.	Critics	of 	trade	agreements	argue	that	these	clauses	are	
likely	to	be	narrowly	interpreted,	providing	scant	protection	from	international	trade	rules	to	public	
health care. Defenders usually argue that they will be given a reasonably expansive definition and 
that	trade	obligations	(at	least	the	more	onerous	WTO	national	treatment	obligations)	will	generally	
not	 apply	 to	public	health	 care	 services.	This	paper	 argues	 that	 although	 the	optimism	of 	 trade	
agreement	defenders	may	be	well-founded	when	viewed	from	a	static	perspective,	the	protection	
afforded	by	exemption	clauses	shrinks	with	the	expansion	of 	market	elements	in	health	care.	Hence,	
the	major	implication	of 	such	“carve-outs”	for	health	policy	makers	will	not	be	the	liberty	to	engage	
in	“business	as	usual”,	but	rather	the	need	to	assess	the	trade-related	risks	associated	with	market-
based	 reform	 in	 the	 future.	 This	 paper	 analyses	 the	WTO	 and	NAFTA	provisions	 limiting	 the	
application	of 	these	trade	agreements	to	the	health	care	sector	in	terms	of 	the	various	risk	scenarios	
posed	by	different	models	of 	health	care	reform.
It	 is	 now	 commonly	 recognised	 that	 international	 economic	 agreements	
–	 whether	 multilateral	 agreements	 under	 the	 auspices	 of 	 the	 World	 Trade	
Organisation	 (WTO),	 or	 bilateral	 or	 regional	 trade	 agreements,	 such	 as	 the	
North	American	Free	Trade	Agreement	(NAFTA)	–	are	rapidly	evolving	into	
instruments	 that	 operate	 inside	 the	 borders	 of 	 countries,	 affecting	 domestic	
policy	through	the	extension	of 	trading	principles	to	the	new	areas	of 	investment,	
intellectual	property	and	services.	Indeed,	if 	there	is	one	factor	that	most	clearly	
distinguishes	 the	 “new	wave”	 of 	 globalisation	 in	 the	 early	 21st	 century	 from	
earlier	epochs,	it	may	well	be	the	pressures	for	reciprocity,	harmonisation	and	
governance	between	advanced	administrative	 and	 regulatory	 regimes	 that	did	
not	 exist	 in	 the	 simpler	 world	 of 	 “small”	 states	 engaged	 in	 “free	 trade”	 (in	
goods)	a	century	or	more	ago.	
The	 Uruguay	 round	 of 	 international	 trade	 negotiations	 that	 created	 the	
WTO	 and	 the	 General	 Agreement	 on	 Trade	 in	 Services	 (GATS)	 not	 only	
extended	 international	 trading	 rules	 to	 services,	 an	 area	 that	 was	 mostly	
excluded	 from	 the	General	Agreement	on	Trade	and	Tariffs	 (GATT),	but	 in	
so doing, actually redefined the scope of  the international trade regime in a 
novel	way	to	 include	three	non-traditional	modes	of 	supply.1	The	breadth	of 	
these	categories	explains	why	the	GATS	has	been	referred	to	simultaneously	as	
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a	trade	agreement,	a	multilateral	 investment	agreement,	and	a	labour	mobility	
agreement.	It	also	suggests	the	potential	for	liberalisation	of 	health	insurance	
and	other	health	services,	as	well	as	escalating	transformations	of 	the	broader	
economic,	 political,	 and	 regulatory	 context	 of 	 health	 care.	 It	 is,	 therefore,	
unsurprising	that	the	launch	of 	the	WTO’s	initial	round	of 	negotiations	under	
the	GATS	 in	February	 2000	occasioned	 a	 good	deal	 of 	 critical	 commentary	
from	 Non-Governmental	 Organisations	 (NGOs)	 and	 others	 concerning	
the	 possible	 deleterious	 impacts	 of 	multilateral	 trade	 liberalisation	 on	 public	
health	 systems	 and	 other	 public	 services.	The	 fear	 is	 that	 international	 trade	
agreements	 constrain	government	 action	 in	 a	way	 that	 could	 adversely	 affect	
either	the	quality,	universality	or	equity	of 	access	to	essential	medical	services	
– by the entry of  foreign for-profit insurers, hospitals, physicians and nurses; or 
by rules that make the future expansion of  public health care more difficult or 
expensive	because	of 	obligations	to	foreign	suppliers.	This	can	be	seen	as	part	
of 	a	larger	analysis	of 	trade	agreements	serving	as	“a	conditioning	institutional	
framework	that	promotes	and	consolidates	neo-liberal	restructuring”	(Grinspun	
and	Kreklewich	1994,	33;	McBride	2001,	103).
The	NAFTA,	a	regional	trading	agreement	built	upon	the	foundations	of 	
the	 earlier	 bilateral	 Canada-US	 Free	 Trade	 Agreement	 (FTA),	 pioneered	 the	
inclusion	of 	service,	 investment	and	 intellectual	property	provisions	 in	major	
international	economic	agreements.	One	particularly	 important	 innovation	of 	
the	NAFTA	was	its	controversial	Chapter	11	on	investor’s	rights,	which	enables	
corporations	 based	 in	 one	NAFTA	 country	 to	 directly	 challenge	 the	 actions	
of 	foreign	governments	without	“their”	government	acting	as	an	intermediary.	
Critics	 have	worried	 that,	 even	 if 	 trade	 and	 investment	 agreements	 can	 play	
a	constructive	role	in	reducing	poverty	and	fostering	sustainable	development	
around	 the	 world,	 legal	 challenges	 from	 private	 actors	 are	 less	 likely	 to	 be	
restrained	 by	 reciprocal	 concerns	 for	 environmental,	 labour,	 or	 social	 policy	
standards.	The	early	results	in	such	cases	as	Ethyl Corp. v. Government of  Canada,2	
S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Government of  Canada,3	Methanex Corp. v. United States,4	 and	
Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States5 lend	credence	to	these	worries.	Foreign	
investors	and	their	companies	operating	in	host	states	are	given	privileged	access	
to	 government	 decision-makers	 on	 actual	 or	 proposed	 measures	 that	 have	
potential	impacts	on	investment,	along	with	a	potential	hammer	with	which	to	
influence policy decisions.6	
One	way	to	reconcile	the	demand	for	international	trade	liberalisation	and	
its	extension	to	services	with	the	public	concern	to	preserve	policy	autonomy	
is	 to	 include	 within	 trade	 agreements	 sectoral	 exemptions	 that	 would	 shield	
essential	public	services	from	application	of 	free	trade	principles.	The	two	most	
important	principles	are	the	most	favoured	nation	principle	(MFN),	or	external	
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non-discrimination	by	a	Member	country	 among	 its	 foreign	 trading	partners,	
and	 the	 national	 treatment	 principle	 (NT),	 or	 non-discrimination	 between	
foreign	and	domestic	 interests	 inside	of 	 a	Member	country.	 In	 the	FTA	and	
NAFTA,	 the	direct	provision	of 	health,	 educational	 and	 social	 services	were	
expressly	exempted	from	both	types	of 	obligation,	but	future	rules	governing	
management	services	(including	health	care	management,	to	the	extent	that	the	
government	allowed	them	to	be	privatised)	were	not	(Doern	and	Tomlin	1991).	
In	the	GATS/WTO,	public	services	are	exempt	by	virtue	of 	either	not	being	
covered	by	the	GATS	general	obligations	(i.e.	MFN	or	transparency	rules),	or	
not being chosen by individual Member countries for specific NT or market 
access	obligations.
This	article	argues	that	several	factors	limit	the	value	of 	sectoral	exemptions	
as	a	strategy	for	insulating	public	health	care	from	international	trade	agreements.	
Part	One	 demonstrates	 that,	 even	 if 	 health	 care	 systems	 are	 viewed	 from	 a	
relatively	static	perspective	and	legal	opinion	favours	a	fairly	broad	interpretation	
of 	exemption	clauses,	the	uncertainties	of 	legal	interpretation	and	the	vagaries	
of 	 international	 dispute	 resolution	 serve	 to	 transform	many	purely	 domestic	
policy	 issues	 into	 essentially	 contestable	 “legal”	 ones	 under	 international	
agreements.	 Part	 Two	 shows	 that	 the	 dynamics	 of 	 international	 health	 care	
reform	 are	 likely	 to	 increase	 the	 exposure	 of 	 domestic	 health	 care	 systems	
to	 international	 trade	 rules	 over	 time.	That	 is	 because	 current	 and	 projected	
trends	in	healthcare	policy	are	in	the	direction	of 	market-based	reforms,	and	the	
applicability	of 	sectoral	exemptions	generally	depends	on	the	degree	to	which	
supply	of 	services	is	market-oriented.	It	follows	from	these	considerations	that	
the	essential	function	of 	carve-outs	is	not	to	preserve	the	historical	insulation	
of 	health	 care	 from	 international	 trade,	but	 to	 structure	 the	 linkage	between	
domestic	and	international	systems	in	this	sector	in	a	way	that	makes	the	degree	
of 	exposure	to	international	rules	a	function	of 	domestic	policy.	The	nature	of 	
this	 linkage	can	be	expected	to	vary	between	countries	and	between	different	
welfare	state	traditions,	but	it	is	largely	unavoidable.
	It	therefore	behooves	health	policy	communities	and	policy	makers	in	all	
advanced	welfare	states	to	not	rely	upon	optimistic	interpretations	of 	trade	treaty	
exemption	clauses	as	a	basis	for	taking	a	“business	as	usual”	approach	to	health	
policy.	It	is	necessary	instead	to	recognise	the	need	for	systematic	integration	of 	
health	and	trade	policies,	and	for	the	strategic	management	of 	trade-related	risks.	
The	aspect	of 	domestic	policy	autonomy	most	clearly	affected	by	international	
trade	agreements	is	policy	reversibility	–	a	very	important	criterion	for	health	care	
reform.	The	areas	most	vulnerable	to	being	removed	from	domestic	control	by	
a trade action include the extension of  public financing to new services that are 
currently provided by private firms (e.g. home care, drug plans, and telehealth 
 - Mark Crawford
in many countries), and the restoration of  public financing or provision in areas 
that	have	been	turned	over	to	private	markets	as	part	of 	health	care	reform.	
I. Legal Interpretations of the GATS and the NAFTA 
A. The Structure of  Trade Agreements: Two Basic Models
As	several	studies	have	pointed	out,	measures	included	in	the	FTA	and	NAFTA	
to	enable	parties	to	protect	or	exempt	public	services	were	necessary	in	order	to	
accommodate	domestic	interests	worried	about	the	effects	of 	“free	trade”	on	
the	welfare	state.	This	was	of 	course	primarily	a	concern	in	Canada,	where	it	
turned	out	to	be	a	central	issue	in	the	1988	federal	election	(Doern	and	Tomlin	
1991;	Hart	2002).	The	creation	of 	express	exemptions	for	social	services	was	
also	necessitated	by	 the	general	 architecture	of 	 the	NAFTA:	 it	 is	primarily	 a	
“top	down”	agreement,	which	binds	parties	unless	they	are	expressly	exempted	
(Sanger	 and	 Sinclair	 2004,	 30-33).	 While	 NAFTA	 critics	 in	 Canada	 have	
sometimes	warned	that	the	Agreement	could	force	Canada	to	open	its	health	care	
“market”,	and	the	federal	government	has	repeatedly	averred	that	health	care	is	
“protected”,	academic	commentators	have	pointed	out	that	both	positions	are	
overly	simplistic.	Although	the	NAFTA	explicitly	protected	 those	health	care	
measures	in	effect	in	Canadian	provinces	at	the	time	of 	the	Agreement’s	coming	
into	force	in	1994,	it	did	nothing	to	protect	future	reforms	that	might	be	needed	
to	modernise	medicare,	such	as	the	expansion	of 	pharmacare	and	home	care.	
While	there	is	little	or	nothing	in	the	NAFTA	to	cause	US-style	“privatisation”	(i.e.	
the replacement of  non-profit hospitals with for-profit firms, or the extension 
of 	private	 insurance	 into	areas	now	subject	 to	 a	public	 insurance	monopoly)	
there	 is	much	 in	 the	Agreement	 to	make	 the	 reversal	 of 	 such	measures	more	
costly and difficult. The NAFTA has been accused of  failing to recognise the 
mixed	public/private	nature	of 	the	health	care	system,	resulting	in	uncertainty	
as	 to	what	services	are	protected	from	application	of 	some	of 	 the	NAFTA’s	
key	provisions.	The	Chapter	11	expropriation	provision	and	somewhat	veiled	
dispute	 settlement	 process	 also	 presented	 particular	 concerns	 for	 some	
commentators,	as	the	reservations	provide	no	direct	protection	from	litigation	
by	private	interests	(Epps	and	Flood	2002;	Van	Duzer	2004a).
The	early	years	of 	the	WTO	have	also	seen	no	shortage	of 	legal	opinions	
about	the	scope	of 	the	GATS,	ranging	from	the	view	that	any	departure	from	
statutory	monopoly	 in	 health	 care	will	 necessarily	 cause	 the	GATS	 to	 apply,	
to	 the	 view	 that	 all	 GATS	 clauses	 will	 be	 interpreted	 so	 as	 to	 give	 priority	
to	 the	 regulatory	 autonomy	 of 	WTO	members.	 Since	 2002,	 legal	 academics	
have	developed	comprehensive	 legal	 strategies	 for	assessing	 the	scope	of 	 the	
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Article	I:3	 (b)	and	 (c)	governmental	authority	exclusion;	 the	Article	XVI	and	
XVII market access and national treatment obligations flowing from specific 
commitments;	 and	 the	Article	VI	 domestic	 regulation	provision,	with	 regard	
to	their	implications	for	public	health	care.	As	a	result,	we	now	have	a	detailed	
analysis	 of 	 these	 GATS	 provisions	 comparable	 to	 that	 already	 accorded	 to	
the	NAFTA	Chapter	11	 and	Social	 Service	Reservation.	Note,	however,	 that	
the	different	structure	of 	the	GATS	limits	the	relevance	of 	the	NAFTA	as	a	
model:	the	GATS/WTO	is	primarily	a	“bottom	up”	agreement,	at	least	when	
it	comes	to	the	most	serious	obligations.	That	is,	the	GATS	only	imposes	full	
national	treatment	obligations	with	respect	to	particular	sectors	if 	a	Member	has	
explicitly	chosen	to	be	bound	in	those	sectors.	
Early	indications	are	that	the	GATS/WTO	model,	with	an	exemption	from	
the most general obligations for public services and a more flexible “bottom up” 
or	“positive	list”	approach,	is	the	preferred	model	for	other	regional	trade	areas.	
This	is	even	true	of 	the	latest	drafts	of 	the	Free	Trade	Area	of 	the	Americas	
(FTAA), which one might expect to be more influenced by the NAFTA model. 
The greater flexibility afforded by the scheduling methodology is seen as more 
desirable by Member states, although it is far from free of  difficulty or hazard, 
as	Canada’s	experience	with	split-run	magazines	illustrates.7	
1.	Canadian	Health	Care	under	the	NAFTA	Social	Service	Reservations	
The	view	that	the	scope	of 	NAFTA	reservations	in	relation	to	Health	Services	
is sufficient to protect publicly funded health care in Canada from any NAFTA 
challenge	 is	a	 reasonable	 interpretation	 from	a	static	perspective,	based	upon	
the accepted definitions of  public and private health services at the time of  
NAFTA’s	inception	(VanDuzer	2004a).	Canada’s	Annex	I	Reservation	states	that	
all	provincial	government	measures	that	were	in	force	as	of 	January	1,	1994	are	
outside	the	NAFTA	rules	relating	to	national	treatment,	MFN,	and	some	other	
disciplines	 relating	 to	 local	 presence	 requirements	 for	 cross-border	 services	
and	 nationality	 requirements	 for	 senior	managers.	 Thus	 the	most	 important	
traditional	 features	 of 	 Canadian	 health	 law	 –	 “medically	 necessary”	 hospital	
services	and	“medically	required”	physician	services	–	are	covered.	Unfortunately,	
however,	the	shift	toward	drug	therapy,	home	care	and	new	technologies	such	
as telehealth largely fall outside this traditional definition of  medicare and may 
not	therefore	be	covered	by	the	Canada	Health	Act	(CHA),	forcing	an	increased	
reliance upon private financing. It is an anomalous feature of  the Canadian 
system	that	drug	treatment	is	only	considered	“medically	necessary”	under	the	
CHA	when	provided	in	hospitals,	and	that	coverage	for	drugs	used	outside	of 	
hospitals	varies	between	provinces	and	generally	involves	considerable	out-of-
pocket	expenses	for	most	categories	of 	patients.	While	a	number	of 	proposals	
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have	been	put	forward	to	provide	universal	drug	coverage	and/or	home	care,	
such	new	policies	will	not	be	covered	by	Annex	I;	and	any	future	measures	that	
exclude	or	otherwise	discriminate	against	US	and	Mexican	providers	of 	services	
will	be	found	to	be	contrary	to	the	NAFTA,	unless	they	are	saved	by	the	Annex	
II	Social	Service	Reservation.	There	are	also	a	growing	variety	of 	public/private	
arrangements	(contracting	out,	licensing,	public/private	joint	ventures,	and	so	
on) that will make it more difficult to draw a clear legal line between “public” 
and	“private”	in	the	future.	
Under	Annex	II	of 	the	NAFTA,	each	Party	reserved	the	right	to	adopt	or	
maintain	any	measure	 relating	 to	health	services	 that	may	be	characterised	as	
being	with	 respect	 to	a	“social	 service	established	or	maintained	 for	a	public	
purpose”.	The	precise	scope	of 	this	Social	Service	Reservation	is	the	subject	of 	
much	debate	and	speculation.	The	US	Trade	Representative	in	1995	suggested	
that	“where	commercial	services	existed	that	sector	no	longer	constituted	a	social	
service	for	a	public	purpose”	(Appleton	1996,	96).	Were	this	interpretation	to	
apply,	it	would	leave	very	little	to	be	protected	by	reservation,	since	most	health	
care	services	in	Canada	are	supplied	by	private	entities,	including	both	(not-for-
profit) hospitals and physicians. The Canadian government has claimed that, to 
the	contrary,	the	broad	ordinary	meaning	of 	“service	established	or	maintained	
for a public purpose” reflects an intention to permit each Party to NAFTA 
to	decide	 for	 itself 	whether	 it	 views	 a	particular	 service	 as	 falling	within	 the	
reservation.	
This is a difficult issue to settle definitively, since the NAFTA leaves both 
the term “social service” and “public purpose” undefined, and the scope of  the 
Annexes	still	have	not	been	tested	before	a	NAFTA	dispute	settlement	tribunal.	
Epps and Flood have argued that the definition of  “social service for a public 
purpose” is satisfied where the government funds the service “for the benefit 
of 	all	those	who	require	them	on	the	basis	that	everyone	ought	to	have	access	
to such care”. They also find that the meaning of  “public purpose” is “arguably 
wide	enough	 to	 include	 services	 that	 the	government	wishes	 to	 fund	 for	 the	
public benefit” (2002, 778). Perhaps they are being a little too sanguine about the 
superiority	of 	the	Canadian	interpretation,	in	view	of 	the	fact	that	the	NAFTA’s	
objectives	 (i.e.	 trade	 liberalisation)	 are	 to	be	used	 to	 assist	 in	 interpreting	 the	
text.	Nevertheless,	 the	Canadian	position	does	appear	 to	be	more	 reasonable	
than	the	American	position,	which	would	render	the	Annex	II	Reservation	little	
more than superfluous. Legal academics generally agree that an objective test 
based	on	general	criteria	for	what	constitutes	a	public	service	is	probably	needed	
in	 addition	 to	 a	 statement	 of 	 public	 purpose	 (Appleton	 1996,	 96;	Epps	 and	
Flood	2002;	Van	Duzer	2004a;	Epps	and	Schneiderman	2005).	Where	full	state	
funding	is	combined	with	extensive	government	control	over	delivery,	then	there	
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is	a	very	strong	case	for	the	application	of 	the	reservation.	It	is	probable	that	
full	state	funding	alone,	or	in	combination	with	a	statement	of 	public	purpose,	
is sufficient even where governments permit competition and for-profit delivery 
in the interests of  efficiency (Epps and Flood 2002, 777-780). 
Nevertheless,	it	is	already	apparent	that	the	Social	Services	Reservation	does	
not protect measures related to for-profit privately funded services of  physicians 
and	other	healthcare	professionals;	or	privately-funded	home	care	or	nursing	
home	 services	 (VanDuzer	 2004a).	 Allowing	 private	 insurance	 for	 services	
designated	 as	 “medically	 necessary”	 would	 further	 reduce	 the	 scope	 of 	 this	
NAFTA	reservation.	Furthermore,	regardless	of 	the	reservation’s	scope,	it	does	
not	provide	protection	 from	 the	Chapter	Eleven	 (article	 1110)	 expropriation	
provision	–	which	does	apply	to	any	services	currently being privately financed 
that	could	lead	to	foreign	companies	bringing	compensation	claims	for	“indirect	
expropriation”	of 	their	investments	in	violation	of 	Canada’s	national	treatment	
obligations. How significant this exposure is depends upon the degree of  market 
penetration	by	foreign	private	insurers	from	NAFTA	partners.
2.	 The	 WTO/GATS	 and	 the	 Article	 I	 (3)	 “Governmental	 Authority”	
Exclusion	Clause
A service “supplied in the exercise of  governmental authority” is defined in 
Article	I:3	as	any	service,	which	is	“supplied	neither	on	a	commercial	basis,	nor	
in	competition	with	one	or	more	service	suppliers”	(WTO	1994,	4).	The	Vienna	
Convention on the Law of  Treaties codifies the most important customary rules 
of 	treaty	interpretation.	Article	31:	1	of 	the	Convention	states	that	a	treaty	shall	
be	 interpreted	“in	good	faith	 in	accordance	with	 the	ordinary	meaning	 to	be	
given	to	the	terms	of 	the	treaty	in	their	context	and	in	the	light	of 	its	objective	
and	 purpose”.	 International	 lawyers	 generally	 give	 pride	 of 	 place	 to	 the	 text	
and	context	of 	 relevant	 treaty	provisions,	using	 the	 intentions	of 	parties	and	
the	objects	and	purposes	of 	treaties	as	supplemental	means	(Sinclair	1984,	114-
118;	Marceau	1999).	WTO	dispute	panels	and	appellate	bodies	have	followed	
this	hierarchy	of 	principles,	 including	the	few	panels	 that	have	dealt	with	the	
GATS	to	date.8	The	same	approach	would	be	applied	to	the	interpretation	of 	
the	governmental	authority	clause	(VanDuzer	2004b,	n.233).	Other	principles	
can	be	applied	on	a	supplemental	basis	if 	circumstances	or	the	treaty	text	call	
for	it.	Of 	these,	the	principle	of 	in dubio mitius,	or	deference	to	the	sovereignty	
of 	 states,	 can	 be	 expected	 to	 be	 used	 in	 legal	 arguments	 over	 the	 scope	 of 	
governmental	authority:	“[i]f 	the	meaning	of 	a	term	is	ambiguous,	that	meaning	
is	 to	be	preferred	which	 is	 less	onerous	 to	 the	party	assuming	an	obligation,	
or	which	interferes	less	with	the	territorial	and	personal	supremacy	of 	a	party,	
or	 involves	 less	general	 restrictions	upon	 the	parties”	 (WTO	Appellate	Body	
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Report	1998,	para	167,	n.	154).
Commentators	 generally	 assume	 that	 a	 pure	 government	 monopoly	 that	
does not charge for its service would meet this definition. Several writers critical 
of 	the	GATS	and	worried	about	its	potential	impacts	on	public	services	have	
alleged	 that	 little	 else	would	be	 covered	by	 the	 clause.	According	 to	 Sinclair,	
these services “are defined so narrowly that the exclusion has very little practical 
value”	(Sinclair	2000,	5).	Sanger	has	added	that	claims	by	WTO	and	Canadian	
officials that health services were absolutely protected by Article I:3 were “at 
odds	 with	 a	 plain	 reading	 of 	 the	 text	 and	 the	 advice	 the	 WTO	 Secretariat	
provides	member	nations”	(Sanger	2001,	113).	Krajewski’s	detailed	legal	analysis	
concluded	that	“[t]he	narrow	meaning	of 	‘governmental	authority’	is	caused	by	
the	dependence	of 	the	clause	on	the	circumstances	of 	supply	and	not	on	the	
nature of  the service. The notion of  competitiveness especially makes it difficult 
to	exclude	any	service	sectors	per se”	(Krajewski	2003,	354).
Although	these	lines	of 	argument	represent	real	possibilities	for	the	future	
development of  the law, they depend in large part on how three more specific 
issues are resolved. First, it is claimed that statements from WTO officials 
indicate	an	intended	or	expected	narrow	interpretation	(Pollock	and	Price	2000;	
Sanger	2001,	113).	Second,	statements	by	Members	themselves	are	held	to	have	
weight,	 such	as	 the	statement	by	 the	EU	and	some	associated	states	 that	 the	
governmental	authority	exclusion	is	similar	to	Article	55	of 	the	Treaty	of 	Rome	
(Krajewski	2003,	363).	Third,	it	has	been	argued	that,	like	Article	55,	Article	I:3	
should	be	 considered	 an	 exception	or	 exemption	clause,	which,	 according	 to	
the	European	Court	of 	Justice,	is	to	be	interpreted	narrowly	(Krajewski	2003,	
365-366).	Statements	from	the	WTO	Secretariat	and	Member	states	about	the	
scope	of 	Article	I:3	may	be	relevant	to	its	interpretation,	but	they	are	so	varied	
and	imprecise	that	their	implications	for	the	scope	of 	government	authority	are	
by	no	means	uniformly	restrictive.	For	example,	the	infamous	WTO	documents	
referred	 to	 above	may	 actually	 have	 been	 an	 attempt	 to	make	 it	 clear	 that	 a	
carve-out	does	not	exempt	private	health	services,	without	necessarily	implying	
that	 public	 provision	would	 be	 affected	 (Adlung	 2001,	 3).	 As	 both	 Johnson	
and	VanDuzer	have	pointed	out,	the	interpretive	rule	that	exceptions	should	be	
narrowly	interpreted	is	increasingly	contested,	and,	in	any	case,	should	have	no	
application	to	the	interpretation	of 	GATS	Article	I:3	(b).	“Exclusion”	for	the	
purpose of  defining the scope of  Members’ obligations toward one another is 
not	the	same	as	an	“exception”	(Johnson	2002,	18-20,	25-26;	VanDuzer	2004b,	
n.	256-261).	
Accordingly,	 the	 potential	 scope	 of 	 Article	 I:3	 may	 be	 broader	 than	
previously	 thought.	While	 the	 legal	meaning	 of 	 “competition”	 in	 services	 is	
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unclear,	 it	 probably	 involves	 consumers	being	 able	 to	 choose	between	“like”	
services	offered	by	different	suppliers	on	the	basis	of 	quality	or	price.	Similarly,	
any finding of  supply to be on a “commercial” basis would need to consider a 
range of  criteria: whether a service is supplied on a for-profit basis; whether user 
fees	are	charged;	whether	any	revenues	earned	in	excess	of 	cost	are	not	devoted	
to fulfilment of  a not-for–profit purpose; and the degree of  government 
involvement	 and	 control	 over	 conditions	 of 	 service	 delivery.	Most	 of 	 these	
criteria, when applied to core medical services that are publicly financed and 
supplied on the basis of  need, would not necessarily indicate their classification 
as	being	supplied	on	a	commercial	basis.	If 	more	aspects	of 	the	public	health	
system	are	found	to	lie	outside	of 	the	Article	I:3	(b)	(c)	exclusion	in	the	future,	
a	 likely	cause	will	be	 the	creation	of 	health	care	markets	 that	can	 trigger	 the	
application	of 	the	“competition”	and	“commercial”	criteria	(Crawford	2005).	
ii. Legal Uncertainty, Differential Impacts, and Risk Analysis in 
Domestic Health Policy Regimes 
If 	the	only	public	services	that	are	certain	to	be	exempt	from	GATS	obligations	
or	 to	be	protected	by	NAFTA	Annex	 II-style	 reservations	are	 those	 that	 are	
“publicly	funded”,	“wholly	managed	by	government”	and	supplied	for	“free”	at	
the	point	of 	consumption,	then	a	lot	may	hinge	upon	the	variety	of 	ways	that	
health	care	services	are	organised	in	different	countries	and	the	general	direction	
of 	international	health	care	reforms	in	welfare-state	democracies.	“The	domestic	
neo-liberal	 agenda	of 	 privatisation	 therefore	 could	place	 all	 that	 is	 privatised	
or	partly	privatised	onto	 the	 international	 agenda	–	and	 this	 is	no	 less	 true	of 	
privatised	services	 in	the	developed	states	than	of 	the	IMF	and	World	Bank-
mandated	privatisation	schemes	 in	developing	countries”	 (Wiener	2005,	158).	
All	real-world	departures	from	the	limiting	case	of 	“pure”	public	services	entail	
some	degree	of 	risk	that	they	are	not	protected	by	trade	treaty	“carve-outs”.	
The	more	that	some	states	involve	elements	of 	competition	and	commercial	
provision of  health services, the more significant these risks are. Those countries 
which	retain	more	elements	of 	a	traditional	publicly-operated	delivery	system	
that	reimburses	hospitals	and	physicians	on	a	fee-for-service	basis	(such	as	the	
original	NHS	system	in	the	UK	or	the	present	system	in	Canada,	where	escalating	
costs	and	recent	legal	and	political	developments	have	also	generated	pressure	
for	market-based	reforms)	are	the	most	insulated	from	trade	treaty	obligations.	
Those	countries	that	have	adopted	elements	of 	an	internal market (government-
appointed	purchasers	to	bargain	and	enter	into	contracts	with	competing	public	
and/or	private	health	service	providers,	on	the	basis	of 	a	“purchaser/provider	
split”,	 as	 in	 the	UK	 or	New	Zealand,	 while	 retaining	 heavy	 reliance	 on	 the	
single	government	payer);	managed competition	(which	requires	private	insurers	to	
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compete	for	customer	allegiance	on	the	basis	of 	cost	and	quality	instead	of 	risk	
avoidance,	as	in	the	Netherlands);	or	managed care	(i.e.	where	an	insurer/purchaser	
attempts to influence the cost, volume, and quality of  health services supplied, 
which	is	consistent	with	internal	market	and	managed	competition	reforms	but	
can	exist	 in	an	ad	hoc	form	resulting	in	competition	between	insurers	on	the	
basis	of 	risk	avoidance,	as	in	the	US)	are	generally	more	likely	to	be	subject	to	
trade	treaty	obligations	(Flood	2000,	4-13).
Uncertainty	 in	 legal	 interpretation	 therefore	 needs	 to	 be	 viewed	 in	 the	
dynamic	contexts	of 	the	near-universal	pressures	for	market-based	health	care	
reform	and	the	evolution	of 	 international	 trade	dispute	settlement.	Although	
there	is	little	sign	as	yet	that	trade	agreements	are	seriously	constraining	domestic	
health	policy	making	or	driving	 international	health	care	 reform,	 there	are	 at	
least	 two	 senses	 in	which	 civil	 society	 and	 academic	 concerns	 are	warranted.	
First,	while	it	appears	that	trade	liberalisation	does	not	imply	“privatisation”	(in	
the sense of  for-profit health care and competitive and commercial delivery), 
to a considerable extent the reverse may be true – specifically when market 
reforms	 cause	 health	 care	 measures	 to	 fall	 outside	 of 	 sectoral	 exemptions	
for	public	services.	Second,	we	can	also	see	that	much	of 	the	potential	policy	
constraint	that	derives	from	trade	rules	comes	from	the	reduced	reversibility	of 	
market-based	policy	options,	rather	than	from	the	operation	of 	market-based	
instruments	themselves.	
A	 rough	 estimation	 of 	 the	 potential	 exposure	 to	 trade	 treaty	 obligations	
of 	 various	 market	 reform	models	 is	 depicted	 in	 Figure	 1.	 The	 accuracy	 of 	
these	preliminary	assessments	is	perhaps	less	important	than	the	methodology	
of 	 undertaking	 assessments	 associated	 with	 health	 care	 reform.	 The	 most	
ubiquitous	model	is	internal	market	reform,	which	can	be	applied	piecemeal	to	
specific services (e.g. physicians, hospitals, pharmaceuticals) and incrementally 
to any public health care system as a response to rising costs or inefficiencies. 
The	principal	worry	here	 is	 that	 a	very	 restrictive	 interpretation	of 	 exclusion	
clauses	will	cause	even	limited	experiments	with	markets	to	fall	outside	of 	the	
GATS	Article	I:3	exclusion	or	the	NAFTA	Annex	II	Social	Service	Reservation.	
This	risk	is	characterised	as	low	to	medium	because	legal	analysis	has	challenged	
some	of 	the	assumptions	underlying	the	more	pessimistic	predictions	of 	trade	
critics,	 and	 because	 legitimacy	 concerns	 are	 arguably	 pushing	WTO	Dispute	
Settlement	toward	what	G.R.	Shell	describes	as	a	“Trade	Stakeholders”	model,	
in	which	the	WTO	dispute	resolution	process	is	open	to	all	groups	with	a	stake	
in	 the	outcomes	of 	 trade	decisions,	at	 least	 in	 the	sense	of 	 transparency	and	
possibility	of 	intervention	through	oral	or	written	submissions	(Shell	1995).	It	
is more difficult to generalise about the degree of  trade-related risk associated 
with	managed	care	reform,	since	it	may	or	may	not	form	a	part	of 	planned	and	
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integrated	health	care	systems	aimed	at	universal	coverage.	Nevertheless,	since	
all	managed	care	schemes	refuse	to	simply	reimburse	hospitals	and	physicians	
for	their	services,	they	are	likely	to	include	more	competitive	and	commercial	
elements	 at	 the	 point	 of 	 delivery	 (Flood	 2000,	 8-9).	Where	managed	 care	 is	
combined with wide open competition between private for-profit insurers 
on	 the	basis	of 	 risk	 avoidance	 as	well	 as	other	 factors,	without	government-
mandated	fee	schedules	and	obligations	for	universal	coverage,	then	the	risk	of 	
both	NAFTA	and	GATS	obligations	are	very	high.	Managed	competition	has	
evolved	 in	continental	Europe,	 initially	 to	give	 the	conservative	employment-
based	 systems	 greater	 universality	 and	 then,	 more	 recently,	 to	 achieve	 some	
of  the administrative efficiencies associated with single-payer systems on the 
Beveridge	 model.	 Reliance	 on	 competition	 between	 private	 insurers	 implies	
exposure	to	GATS	obligations,	but	this	risk	is	mitigated	somewhat	by	the	highly	
regulated	and	mandated	nature	of 	the	competition,	which	could	be	described	as	
being	de facto	no	closer	to	an	open	market	than	fee-for	service	or	internal	market	
reform	in	Beveridge	systems.
 
A. Trade-Related Uncertainty and the Reform of  “Beveridge” Health Care systems: UK, 
New Zealand, Australia, Canada, Sweden 
Welfare	state	reform	has	been	on	the	public	agenda	of 	most	industrial	democracies	
at	least	since	the	mid-1980s,	and	for	broadly	similar	reasons:	the	growth	in	the	
health	care	component	of 	budgets	has	prompted	calls	for	review	in	times	of 	
burgeoning public debt; concerns over inefficiency, reduced access and quality 
of 	services;	and	the	political	wearing	down	of 	the	post-war	Keynesian	welfare	
state	 consensus	 and	 consequent	 rise	 of 	 conservative	or	 neo-liberal	 policy,	 as	
most	boldly	represented	by	the	governments	of 	Margaret	Thatcher	and	Ronald	
Reagan	(Marmor	1999,	265).	Nevertheless,	 it	 is	useful	to	group	welfare	states	
into two broad categories in terms of  financing structure, since these different 
structures influence how health services are organised (and hence how they 
are reformed). The first is the group of  systems financed out of  general tax 
revenues	named	after	the	creator	of 	the	National	Health	Service	(NHS)	after	
the	Second	World	War,	Lord	Beveridge.	The	second	is	a	social	insurance	model	
called	the	Bismarck	model	after	Otto	von	Bismarck,	the	architect	of 	the	late-
nineteenth	century	German	welfare	state.
	 The	 Beveridge	 model,	 in	 its	 original	 form,	 was	 highly	 integrated,	
with	 the	 government	 acting	 as	 both	 the	 payer	 and	 the	 provider	 of 	 health	
care	 services.	 This	 is	 unsurprising	 given	 the	 socialist	 vision	 of 	 the	 Labour	
Government	 and	 the	 UK’s	 status	 as	 a	 unitary	 state	 governed	 according	 to	
parliamentary	supremacy.	Tax-based	systems	typically	place	a	greater	emphasis	
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on	primary	care,	prevention,	home	care,	and	pay	doctors	on	a	salaried	(fee-for-
service) or capitated (pre-paid care, per-capita, for a defined group of  patients) 
basis. The greater administrative efficiency of  an integrated public payment-
and-delivery	 system	(since	governments	do	not	expend	resources	 in	avoiding	
risk	 and	 risk-rating	 of 	 premiums,	 and	 typically	 experience	 lower	 transaction	
costs)	 has	 arguably	 been	 responsible	 for	 the	 Beveridge	 countries	 historically	
absorbing	two-to	three	percent	less	of 	GDP	than	the	Bismarck	systems	(Fuller	
1998).	 Canadian	medicare,	 which	was	 adopted	 in	 all	 provinces	 in	 the	 1960s,	
deviated	from	the	Beveridge	model	insofar	as	it	relied	on	private	sector	delivery	
by physicians and not-for-profit hospitals. It also fails to cover many core health 
services	when	they	are	provided	outside	of 	hospitals.	
In	the	late	1980s	and	early	1990s	both	the	UK	and	New	Zealand	released	
proposals	for	“internal	market	reform”	in	response	to	what	were	perceived	as	
inefficiencies caused by health authorities being both purchasers and providers 
of 	 public	 hospital	 services.	 Both	 countries	 split	 the	 purchaser	 and	 provider	
roles	of 	regional	or	area	health	authorities,	which	were	no	longer	permitted	to	
provide	health	 services	 directly.	 Public	 hospitals	 are	 now	managed	by	 “NHS	
Trusts”	in	the	UK	and	“Crown	Health	Enterprises”	in	New	Zealand,	which	are	
meant to act like private firms and compete with each other and with private 
firms for supply contracts with the new Health Authorities. Exceptions to the 
purchaser/provider	split	came	in	the	form	of 	such	managed	care	arrangements	
as	the	“GP	Fundholders”	in	the	UK	(abolished	in	the	New	Labour	reforms	of 	
1997	and	replaced	by	larger	groups	of 	doctors	and	nurses	called	“Primary	Care	
trusts”)	and	“Independent	Practice	Associations”	in	New	Zealand	(or	“Budget-
holders”).	New	Zealand	has	also	seen	out-of-pocket	expenditures	increase,	with	
a	 new	 array	 of 	 user	 charges	 and	 patient	 copayments	 at	 the	 point	 of 	 service	
(Donelan	et	al.	1999,	214).
While	these	“internal	market”	reforms	are	criticised	by	advocates	of 	managed	
competition	because	they	still	force	citizens	to	rely	upon	government-appointed	
health	authorities	to	purchase	services	on	their	behalf,	and	patients	cannot	switch	
their	 share	of 	public	 funding	 to	 competing	purchasers,	 this	 feature	probably	
yields a significantly reduced likelihood that a particular health care service falls 
outside	of 	the	Article	I:3	“governmental	authority”	clause.	As	discussed	above,	
legal	analysts	have	found	some	good	grounds	for	believing	that	this	clause	will	
be	 given	meaningful	 scope,	 since	 its	 “ordinary	meaning”	 in	 the	 light	 of 	 the	
“objective	and	purpose”	of 	 the	GATS	will	mean	balancing	the	goal	of 	 trade	
liberalisation	against	respect	for	domestic	policy	objectives	and	sovereignty.	The	
mere	 splitting	 of 	 purchaser/provider	 roles	 in	 order	 to	 facilitate	 competitive	
bidding	for	contracts	from	Health	Authorities	should	only	result	in	a	low	risk to	
trigger	the	GATS	obligations,	because	being	“supplied	neither	on	a	commercial	
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basis,	nor	in	competition	with	one	or	more	service	suppliers”	can	be	interpreted	
as	an	over-all	characterisation	of 	the	service	as	it	is	provided	to	the	patients	(a	
narrower	 interpretation	 that	 seizes	upon	 the	 existence	of 	 any	 competitive	or	
commercial	aspects	to	trigger	an	obligation	would	likely	render	the	clause	largely	
superfluous in several countries, as where private physicians and hospitals are 
publicly	funded).	In	particular	cases,	however,	much	may	turn	on	whether	the	
“internal market” really is internal; the more that for-profit contractors are 
competing	on	the	basis	of 	price	and	quality	and	the	 less	 that	Government	 is	
directly	regulating	the	provision	of 	services,	the	stronger	the	likelihood	that	the	
case	will	be	characterised	as	being	supplied	“in	competition”.
Another	prominent	feature	of 	British	NHS	reforms,	however,	has	been	the	
reliance	upon	“Private	Finance	Initiatives”	 (i.e.	Public-Private	Partnerships	or	
P3s) to finance and run hospitals. 94 percent of  new hospitals built since 1997 
have	 relied	 on	PFIs,	which	 have	 proven	 to	 be	 highly	 controversial.	Whether	
improvements	in	private	investment	and	patient	choice	have	actually	outweighed	
costs	 in	 terms	 of 	 diverted	 resources	 from	 integrated	 front-line	 care	 is	 hotly	
debated;	it	is	claimed	by	many	that	price	competition	in	a	balkanised	NHS	has	
actually	harmed	quality	of 	service	(Pollock,	Shaoul,	and	Vickers,	2002).	These	
reforms	could	also	be	controversial	for	their	trade	treaty	implications:	the	more	
that revenues earned by hospitals are devoted to for-profit purposes, the more 
that	user	fees	are	charged,	and	the	more	that	competition	between	hospitals	or	
PFIs	 is	directed	toward	the	ultimate	consumers	of 	services	 (i.e.	patients)	and	
not	just	to	Health	Authorities,	then	the	more	likely	it	is	that	NHS	reforms	will	
be	characterised	as	“commercial”	services	and	no	longer	as	“in	the	exercise	of 	
governmental	authority”.	
The	issue	of 	reversibility	of 	privatised	health	services	illustrates	what	is	at	
stake	for	democratic	policy-making	in	this	context.	A	strength	of 	parliamentary	
systems	 is	 that	 the	 fusion	 of 	 executive	 and	 legislature	 not	 only	 can	 make	
innovation easier, but can also make it difficult to bind future parliaments: 
mistakes	 can	 be	 undone.	 It	 is	 reasonable	 to	 hypothesise	 that	 Beveridge-style	
systems that experiment with for-profit delivery of  essential health care services 
are	strong	candidates	for	policy	reversal	in	the	future.	Although	such	innovations	
are	frequently	attractive	in	the	short-run,	since	private	investors	in	hospitals	and	
clinics	bring	additional	supply	to	market	more	quickly	and	at	a	lower	direct	cost	
to taxpayers, the steady flow of  public funds to private shareholders and the 
mixed results in terms of  cost efficiency and value for money is likely to cause 
public	enthusiasm	to	wane.9	Sweden	is	a	case	in	point:	it	has	backed	out	of 	its	
experiment with for-profit hospitals, begun in 2002 and suspended in 2006 after 
an	election	largely	fought	on	the	issue	(Sandborn	2006).	
In	 Canada,	 analysts	 on	 the	 political	 right	 blame	 public	 monopoly	 of 	
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financing and lack of  competition in delivery for the fact that Canada’s medical 
system	 has	 cost	more	 than	 other	 Beveridge	 systems	 (e.g.	 Premiers	 Advisory	
Council	 on	 Medicare	 2002;	 Esmail,	 Walker,	 and	 Yeudall	 2004).	 Analysts	 on	
the	left	are	more	likely	to	blame	the	high	costs	associated	with	fee-for-service	
and	 the	public	purchaser/private	provider	 split	 (e.g.	Gibson	and	Fuller	2006;	
Sanger	and	Sinclair	2004).	Each	point	of 	view	has	very	different	implications	for	
reform that are difficult to fully evaluate. It is nonetheless quite easy to compare 
them	 in	 terms	of 	 the	 risks	 they	pose	of 	 incurring	 trade	 treaty	obligations.	A	
pure	public	service	for	health	care,	as	in	the	original	NHS	Beveridge	model,	is	
certainly	outside	of 	both	GATS	general	obligations	and	NAFTA	obligations.	
Canada’s	existing	system	of 	single	public	payer	and	private	delivery	of 	hospital	
and	physician	services	is	probably	also	free	of 	such	trade	treaty	obligations	but,	
as	market-based	reforms	are	introduced	and	the	nature	of 	medically	necessary	
services	changes,	the	risk	of 	exposure	to	the	GATS	and	the	NAFTA	will	rise.	
It	also	appears	likely	that	the	growth	of 	private	health	insurance	for	essential	
medical	services,	such	as	is	allowed	for	in	the	recent	Supreme	Court	of 	Canada	
decision	 striking	 down	 the	 Quebec	 Government’s	 ban	 on	 private	 insurance	
where	waiting	 lists	 threaten	 “life,	 liberty	 and	 security	 of 	 the	 person”10	 could	
attract	not	only	MFN	obligations	under	the	GATS,	but	also	National	Treatment	
and	Chapter	11	obligations	under	the	NAFTA	(Epps	and	Schneiderman	2005).	
In addition, Canada’s earlier commitments at the WTO to liberalise financial 
services	 included	 private	 health	 insurance,	 because	 the	 government	 had	
mistakenly	assumed	that	these	would	not	include	medically	necessary	services	
in	 the	 foreseeable	 future	 (Crawford	 2006).	The	Government	 of 	Quebec	has	
responded	with	 a	 strategy	 of 	minimal	 compliance	 that	will	 result	 in	 little	 or	
no	market	 penetration	 by	 foreign	 private	 insurers,	 rendering	 the	 issue	moot	
for	 the	 time	 being.	The	Government	 of 	Alberta	 had	 signalled	 its	 interest	 in	
experimenting	with	private	insurance,	although	it	later	backed	down	from	this	
position.11	The	adoption	in	a	Canadian	province	of 	an	Australian-style	two-tier	
“medicare–plus	optional	 private	 insurance”	would	probably	 attract	 all	 of 	 the	
aforementioned	GATS	and	NAFTA	obligations,	at	least	for	the	private	portion	
of 	the	service.
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Figure 1
Health Care Reform and Associated Risk of Trade-Treaty 
Obligations
Internal	Market Managed	Competition Managed	Care
Examples UK	Health	
Authorities	buy	
hospital	services	
from	NHS	Trust	
and	physician	
services	from	GP	
Fundholders
•	 Contractors	
bidding	for	
contracts	
from	health	
authorities	(e.g.	
as	proposed	
in	Canada	
by	Senate	
Committee)	
in	lieu	of 	
passively	
reimbursing	
hospitals	and	
physicians	for	
services
•	 Most	applicable	
to		Beveridge		
systems	
and	social	
democracies	
seeking	cost	
control	
•	 Dutch	private	
insurers	must	
insure	everyone	
and	charge	same	
flat fee for all 
of 	their	clients.	
Competition	on	
basis of  flat fee 
and	quality	of 	
services	regulated	
and	largely	funded	
by	government	
Sponsor
•	 Government	
mandates	
universal	coverage	
and	prevents	
competition	
between	insurers	
on	risk	avoidance
•	 Most	applicable	
to	“Bismarck”	
systems	that	have	
contributory	and	
employment-based	
social	insurance
•	 Insurer/purchaser	(e.g.	
Health	Maintenance	
Organisation	in	the	US)	
contracts	with	hospitals,	
doctors,	etc.	to	provide	
care	to	more	patients	in	
return	for	a	discount	(as	
compared	to	indemnity	
insurance)
•	 Physicians	may	be	paid	
on	a	capitation	basis	(per	
enrolee)
•	 Not	necessarily	universal	
coverage;	competition	
may	be	allowed	on	risk	
avoidance
•	 Most	applicable	to	
“liberal”	systems
Potential	
Exposure	
to	Trade	
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risk	of 	service	
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GATS	Article	
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of 	NAFTA	
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Social	Service	
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•	 Medium	risk	
that	NAFTA	
contractors	
will	have	
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investor	rights
•	 Medium	risk	of 	
service	falling	
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GATS	Article	I:3	
(competitive	for-
profit insurers are 
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regulated	and	
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•	 Medium	risk	of 	
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•	 High	risk	that	
countries	with	
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area	of 	private	
health	insurance	
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GATS	MFN	and	
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•	 High	risk	of 	GATS	
NT	obligations	where	
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area	of 	private	insurance
•	 High	NAFTA	risk,	
esp.	in	absence	of 	
government	clearly	
mandating	coverage	and	
premiums
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B. Trade-Related Uncertainty and the Reform of  Insurance-based “Bismarck” Health Care 
Systems: Netherlands, France, Germany 
European	 countries	 continue	 to	 retain	 remarkably	 distinctive	 national	 health	
care	 systems,	notwithstanding	pressures	 to	harmonise	 regulations	 and	 loosen	
restrictions	 on	 the	 mobility	 of 	 health	 care	 providers,	 and	 the	 adoption	 of 	
common	external	trade	policies.	Of 	the	102	signatories	to	the	1997	Financial	
Services	 Agreement,	 80	 made	 commitments	 in	 the	 health	 insurance	 sub-
sector,	including	the	Member	states	of 	the	EU.	The	potential	impacts	of 	these	
commitments can vary significantly between Members, however. While the 
effect is to create a more level global playing field for private service providers, 
the	impacts	for	citizen/consumers	are	likely	to	prove	more	uneven.	
Given the importance attached to public funding as a criterion for finding 
health	care	 services	 to	be	covered	by	 the	GATS	Article	 I:3	 and	 the	NAFTA	
Annex	II	Social	Service	Reservation,	what	can	be	said	about	 insurance-based	
or “Bismarck” systems that have been financed by a mixture of  public and 
private	 sources?	 For	 example,	 the	 Netherlands	 prior	 to	 its	 1987	 “managed	
competition” reform proposals had a system that was financed 14 percent from 
general	 taxation,	60	percent	from	compulsory	health	 insurance	premiums,	16	
percent	from	voluntary	health	insurance	premiums,	and	11	percent	from	patient	
user	 fees	 (Flood	2000,	62).	This	 fragmentation	of 	 funding	between	different	
insurers	 led	 to	 higher	 costs	 than	 the	 Beveridge	 “single-payer”	model,	 owing	
to	 the	 inability	of 	 the	government	 to	control	 cost-shifting	and	co-ordination	
problems.	 Nevertheless,	 the	 Dutch	 government	 did	 not	 try	 to	 overturn	 the	
entire Bismarck model; instead, a system of  private insurers and non-profit 
Sickness	 Funds	 contracting	 with	 private	 health	 care	 providers	 was	 brought	
under	tighter	government	regulation	in	order	to	ensure	that	competition	occurs	
between	 insurers	 on	 the	basis	 of 	 cost	 and	quality	 rather	 than	 risk	 avoidance	
(Flood 2002, 6-7). As a system financed progressively with little direct relation 
between	 individual	 contributions	 and	entitlements	 (the	Government	Sponsor	
pools	the	funds	and	regulates	the	competition	between	insurer/purchasers	for	
enrolees),	government-mandated	insurance	is	able	to	insure	nearly	100	percent	
of 	the	Dutch	population.	
Is	 the	 health	 care	 system	 of 	 the	Netherlands	 subject	 to	 a	GATS	Article	
I:3	 obligation	 to	meet	WTO	 transparency	 standards	 and	 to	 not	 discriminate	
between	 foreign	 insurers	 and	 service	 providers?	 The	 rebuttal	 to	 Markus	
Krajewski’s analysis of  the GATS “government authority” clause, which finds 
that it is narrow because it is “defined in terms of  the economic basis and 
circumstances	of 	 the	 supply	 and	not	 in	 respect	 to	 the	public	 interest	of 	 the	
service”,	 is	 that	 public	 funding	 is	 the	 pre-eminent	 criterion	 for	 triggering	 an	
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Article	I:3	obligation.	In	the	Netherlands,	the	post-1988	managed	competition	
reforms	 do	 not	 fundamentally	 alter	 the	 plural/private	 sources	 of 	 funding.	
Although the Government’s specification of  insurance plans and regulation of  
prices	 attenuates	 the	“commercial”	 and	“competitive”	aspects	of 	 the	 system,	
it is difficult to see how the system as a whole could fall within the GATS 
exclusion.	In	particular,	the	preservation	of 	consumer/patient	choice	of 	insurer	
would appear to meet even the narrowest definition of  a service supplied “in 
competition”	(Krajewski	2003,	352-353).	
The	 French	 Public	 Health	 Insurance	 System	 (PHIS)	 evolved,	 like	 the	
German	and	Dutch	 systems,	 from	a	variegated	collection	of 	 funds	originally	
based	on	professional	activity	with	disparate	reimbursement	rates,	into	a	more	
standardised	system	characterised	by	uniform	rates	and	universal	entitlement	for	
all	legal	residents.	Most	funds	are	still	private	entities,	however,	jointly	managed	
by employers’ and union federations under State supervision (Couffinhal 
2001).	One	 reason	 that	waiting	 lists	 are	not	 the	problem	 in	France	 that	 they	
are	elsewhere	is	that	there	is	no	physician	gatekeeping	in	France,	but	there	is	a	
tariff 	(“conventionée”)	at	the	point	of 	service,	regardless	of 	whether	the	service	
provider	is	“public”	or	“private”.	Sometimes	additional	charges	(“dépassements”)	
are	also	 levied.	Since	100%	reimbursement	 is	not	always	provided,	and	 there	
are	 almost	 always	 tariffs	 to	 pay,	most	 French	 residents	 purchase	 a	 “top	 up”	
insurance	 policy	 from	 a	 variety	 of 	 providers,	 including	 some	 foreign	 private	
insurance	 companies.	Again,	 the	 elements	 of 	 patient	 choice	 and	 payment	 to	
competing (and sometimes for-profit) firms at the point of  service would 
make it difficult to place French health care entirely within the “governmental 
authority”	exemption,	although	it	 is	possible	that	trade	treaty	obligations	may	
only	apply	to	the	“top	up”	portion	of 	the	service.
In	Germany,	residents	earning	below	a	stipulated	income	level	are	obligated	
to	belong	to	the	statutory	health	insurance	system	based	on	some	600	“Sickness	
Funds”	(Krankenkassen),	which	are	billed	directly	for	most	medically	necessary	
services,	although	co-payment	from	patients	is	required	for	pharmaceuticals	and	
dental	work.	Patients	at	higher	income	levels	have	the	option	of 	staying	in	the	
state	plan	 at	 a	higher	premium	or	opting	out	 in	 favour	of 	private	 insurance.	
Here,	 the	 high	 proportion	 of 	 public	 funding	 and	 government	 regulation	
coupled	with	a	 fairly	clear	separation	from	the	private	system	would	make	at	
least	the	basic	(obligatory)	system	a	good	candidate	for	coverage	by	the	Article	
I:3	 “governmental	 authority”	 exemption.	 Remember,	 however,	 that	 the	EC’s	
commitments	 in	private	health	 insurance	mean	 that,	as	 in	France,	 the	private	
system	is	subject	to	National	Treatment	and	Market	Access	obligations	of 	the	
GATS,	and	not	just	the	general	MFN	and	transparency	requirements.
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iii. Conclusion: The Need to Incorporate Trade Law Considerations 
into Health Care Policy-Making and Risk Management
It	 is	 an	 illusion	 to	 think	 that	a	 reasonably	broad	 interpretation	of 	 the	GATS	
Article	 I:3	 “Governmental	 Authority”	 clause,	 the	 NAFTA	 Annex	 II	 Social	
Service	Reservation,	or	 any	other	 trade	 treaty	provision	will	 in	 itself 	 insulate	
health care policy from constraint by international trade rules. The difficulty is 
that	(1)	estimating	health	care’s	insulation	from	largely	untested	and	uninterpreted	
parts of  trade treaties is a probabilistic, not a categorical exercise, reflecting a 
risk	and	uncertainty	that	is	simply	too	great	to	be	ignored	by	domestic	decision-
makers;	and	(2)	the	general	direction	of 	health	care	reform	in	most	advanced	
industrial	democracies	is	raising	the	risk	of 	triggering	trade	treaty	obligations,	
regardless	of 	other	trends	such	as	those	in	dispute	settlement.	Since	trade-related	
risks	are	unavoidable	as	well	as	important,	it	is	time	to	acknowledge	the	mutual	
constitution	of 	trade	and	health	law,	and	to	more	fully	coordinate	and	integrate	
trade	and	social	policy.
 As the case of  Sweden illustrates, significant moves toward competitive 
for-profit delivery of  health services are likely candidates for policy reversal in 
the	future.	Policy-makers	will	need	to	assess:	what	are	the	costs,	in	terms	of 	trade	
concessions to WTO Members and NAFTA compensation to firms, of  future 
re-socialisation	of 	medicine?	What	value	is	to	be	placed	upon	policy	reversibility	
as	a	criterion	of 	public	policy	and	policy	autonomy?	What	are	the	costs	in	terms	
of 	trade	treaty	obligations	of 	expanding	the	public	sector	into	new	areas	that	
currently	have	foreign	private	sector	suppliers?	Even	on	an	optimistic	view	of 	
the	scope	of 	public	sector	exemptions	and	the	future	evolution	of 	WTO	law,	it	
is	plain	that	there	is	no	going	back	to	the	watertight	compartments	of 	the	past.
Notes
1.	 Thus,	 the	GATS	covers	not	 just	cross-border	 trade,	such	as	 (in	 the	case	of 	health	services)	
provision	of 	diagnosis	or	treatment	planning	services	in	country	A	by	suppliers	in	Country	B	via	
telemedicine	(mode	1),	but	also	consumption	abroad,	e.g.,	movement	of 	patients	from	Country	A	
to	Country	B	for	treatment	(mode	2);	commercial	presence	in	a	country,	e.g.,	establishment	of,	or	
investment	 in,	hospitals	 in	a	country	by	foreigners	 (mode	3);	and	temporary	presence	of 	natural	
persons	in	a	client/host	country,	e.g.,	service	provision	in	Country	A	by	health	professionals	from	
Country	B	(mode	4).	
2.	 Ethyl	Corp.	v.	Government	of 	Canada,	Award	on	Jurisdiction	(June	24,	1998),	38	I.L.M.	708	
(1999),	available	at	http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/ethyl-en.asp.
3.	 S.D.	Myers,	Inc.	v.	Government	of 	Canada,	Second	partial	Award	(Oct.	21,	2002),	available	at	
http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/gov-e.asp.
4.	 Methanex	Corp.	v.	United	States,	Preliminary	Award	on	Jurisdiction	and	Admissibility	(Aug.	7,	
2002),	available	at	http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/12613.pdf.
5.	 United	Mexican	States	v.	Metalclad	Corp.,	Notice	of 	Abandonment	of 	Appeal	(Oct.	30,	2001),	
available	at	http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/metalcladCorpen.
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asp;	United	Mexican	States	v.	Metalclad	Corp.,	Notice	of 	Abandonment	of 	Cross-Appeal	(Oct.	30	
2001),	available	at	http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/metalcladCorp-en.asp.
6.	 See,	for	example,	Grady	and	McMillan	1999,	93;	McBride	2001,	109-113.
7.	 See	 e.g.	 Sinclair	 2000,	 54-55,	 81.	The	WTO	panel	 found	 that	Canadian	 and	US	magazines	
were	“like	goods”	and	that	the	Canadian	measure	to	subject	foreign	split-run	magazines	to	a	tax	
on	advertising	designed	 to	protect	Canada’s	culturally	distinctive	magazine	 industry	was	 ruled	 to	
violate national treatment under NAFTA. Canadian trade officials had argued that advertising 
was	a	“service”	and	that	Canada	had	scrupulously	avoided	commitments	in	this	area	in	the	GATS	
negotiations.	The	panel	reasoned	that	goods	and	services	were	“overlapping”	and	that	the	measure	
had	to	comply	with	both	the	GATT	and	the	GATS.
8.	 EU	–	Bananas,	Canada	–	Periodicals,	Canada	–	Autopact,	and	Mexico	–	Telecommunications.	
Disputes,	chronologically	available	on	the	WTO	website.
9.	 In	one	study	conducted	at	McMaster	University,	a	team	of 	20	researchers	reviewed	788	medical	
articles	on	hospital	 care,	eventually	honing	 in	on	 the	8	highest	quality	and	most	 relevant	 studies	
–	which	 included	a	 total	of 	350,000	patients	and	a	median	of 	324	hospitals	 in	each	study.	They	
contacted the original authors to verify the findings, then used advanced statistical techniques to 
combine the 8 studies. Of  the 8 studies, only one showed that for-profits had lower costs. See 
Devereaux,	Schunemann,	et	al.	2004,	1817-1824.
10.	 Chaoulli	v.	Quebec	(Attorney-General),	2005	SCC	35.	
11.	 On	April	20,	2006,	 the	Government	of 	Alberta	announced	that	 it	was	not	proceeding	with	
plans	to	expand	private	health	insurance	and	to	let	doctors	work	in	both	public	and	private	systems,	
due	to	public	opposition	and	concerns	about	non-compliance	with	the	Canada Health Act, which	
could	lead	to	the	federal	government	withholding	transfer	funds	for	health	care.
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